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This paper investigates the organizational importance of relative CEO compensation in 
trade associations and professional societies. It is known that there is variation in how 
much pay is tied to performance in different subcategories of nonprofit organizations. 
However, instead of looking at how performance affects pay, we investigate how CEO 
compensation affects organization performance when CEOs are aware of their peer 
compensation and are able to influence their own. We hypothesized that CEOs who 
knowingly earn less will be associated with both greater financial and nonfinancial 
organizational performance. This altruistic perspective draws on theories from 
leadership and psychology rather than the more typical agency perspective and focuses 
on the alignment between CEO and stakeholders in a nonprofit setting. We find strong 
support for the relationship between lower relative CEO compensation and organization 
performance, while results for the moderating effect of organizational size are mixed.  
 
Keywords: Nonprofit Organizations, Executive Compensation, CEO Compensation  
 
 
Citizens and lawmakers are increasingly concerned about the growing pay gap between chief 
executive officers (CEOs) and employees in developed nations (Hodgson, 2015; Pinsker, 2016). 
As evidence of this growing concern, new regulations in 2016 require public companies in the 
United States to publish the ratio of CEO compensation relative to the company’s average 
employee compensation (Dodd-Frank Act, 2010). Similar concerns regarding CEO pay are also 
evident within the nonprofit sector, where excessive compensation is generally frowned upon 
(Parker, 2013). Given that charitable organizations have a mission to serve the public instead of 
generating a monetary profit for its shareholders, which confers a tax-exempt status (Internal 
Revenue Service, IRS; 2017), exorbitant nonprofit CEO salaries may be seen as particularly 
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egregious. As such, some states are considering limits on nonprofit CEO salaries (Meiksins, 
2013).  
 
Arguably, nonprofit CEO compensation is subject to different rules than corporate CEO 
compensation due to a nondistribution constraint. As one of the tax-exemption requirements, 
the nondistribution constraint legally bars nonprofits from distributing any excess earnings to 
those in control of the organization (IRS, 2017). This highlights that the predictors of nonprofit 
CEO compensation may be different than those for for-profit CEO compensation, although 
common factors such as market size, organizational scope, number of employees, and annual 
budget all likely still play a role in determining nonprofit CEO compensation levels (Grasse, 
Davis, & Ihrke, 2014; Hallock, 2002; Frumkin & Keating, 2010; Newton, 2015). Interestingly, 
some nonprofit hospitals in the United States tie their CEO compensations to turnover and 
financial performance indicators (Brickley & Van Horn, 2002), and research on CEO 
compensation in art and education organizations has demonstrated a positive relationship on 
organization’s performance (Carroll, Hughes, & Luksetich, 2005). 
 
The ongoing conversations about CEO pay and organizational performance in nonprofit 
organizations are also a result of the pressure to become more effective and efficient, where both 
lower relative pay and higher relative performance foster a reputation of a good steward of 
public money. This strategy can also be used intentionally to boost an organization’s public 
profile, improve internal employee motivation, or as a sign of dedication to the mission and the 
sector. And considering that nonprofits are limited in the number of instruments to affect 
performance compared with their for-profit counterparts (i.e., nonprofits cannot pay dividends), 
the issue of how CEO pay affects organizational performance may be especially salient for a 
broad array of stakeholders. In addition, given the existence of current high-profile examples of 
corporate CEOs reducing their compensation to increase employee salaries (Isidore, 2015) or to 
boost firm performance (MacMillan, 2013), we question whether this also happens in the 
nonprofit sector. Regardless of the distribution constraint, there seems to be a link between CEO 
compensation and organizational performance in nonprofit organizations. Furthermore, 
considering the diversity of the nonprofit sector and how it operates, one can expect a certain 
level of variation in nonprofit compensation incentives (Newton, 2015). 
 
Reflecting on this, we were intrigued by the question as to whether some CEOs knowingly (and 
on purpose) earn less than their peers. If so, does this have an impact on organizational 
performance? While there is a plethora of factors that predict nonprofit CEO compensation, 
what has been explored less is the impact that nonprofit CEO compensation has on 
organizational performance. Thus, this paper investigates the impact of CEO compensation on 
organizational performance in a subsector of mutual benefit/membership nonprofits. This type 
of nonprofit organization consists of trade and business leagues, professional associations, and 
membership societies that serve the interests of a specific industry or profession and provide 
benefits to dues-paying members (Reilly, Hull, & Braig Allen, 2003). Theoretically, mutual 
benefit organizations are organized for the self-interest of their members. Some describe this 
type of nonprofit as bordering nonprofit and for-profit sectors, in which commercial and 
nonprofit activities are combined to meet client or member demands (Fine, Ropa, & Jay, 2008). 
 
However, these organizations benefit society by promoting good citizenship in industry and 
commerce. It is represented through activities such as the establishment of professional 
standards and performance, certification and licensing, ethical guidance and codes of conduct, 
professional service values advocacy, and research and knowledge creation, all of which will 
result in higher public safety outcomes. The role of serving the public provides a rationale for 
their nonprofit exemptions. Therefore, the broad benefits to the public are found in the 
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professional membership association’s mission to strengthen the profession, and the narrow 
functions they serve are reflected in membership benefits. 
 
Most research on professional associations focused on the membership side of organizational 
activities, such as joining, volunteering, and retention (Gazley, 2013; Bauman, 2008), whereas a 
lot less is known about management and governance of these organizations. Haynes and Gazley 
(2011) noted that the lack of empirical research in the context of professional membership 
associations have set back the knowledge expansion about this subfield of nonprofit 
organizations, where most research is focused around traditional charitable types of nonprofits. 
Thus, studying professional membership associations, which reside at the intersection of the 
sectors, provides a fruitful and unexplored area of scholarly research. 
 
This research expands knowledge about organizations that are not a usual part of the core of 
research in the nonprofit sector and contributes to the literature in three primary ways. First, we 
focus on relative CEO compensation, using a framework drawing from social comparison and 
servant leadership rather than agency theory, a comparison still under discussion in the 
nonprofit sector (e.g., Van Puyveldeet, Caers, Du Bois, & Jegers, 2016). Second, we examine a 
sample of CEOs who have access to peer compensation data, a feature of our study that has not 
been available in previous studies. Third, we utilize both financial and nonfinancial performance 
measures to address multiple outcomes valued by nonprofits. We begin with a literature review 
of CEO compensation and performance and then draw from socal comparison and servant 
leadership literatures to develop and test six hypotheses concerning the relationship between 
CEO relative compensation and nonprofit performance. 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
Considering complexities accompanying typical nonprofits, such as nondistribution constraint 
and hard-to-measure performance indicators, one would expect a limited effect of compensation 
on performance (Oster, 1998). From a number of studies looking at the effects of compensation 
on performance, Carroll, Hughes, and Luksetich (2005) found that, while performance increases 
as executive compensation increases in larger organizations, the inverse is true in smaller 
organizations. Similarly, Frumkin and Keating (2010) found that nonprofit CEOs compensation 
is comparable with other similar-sized organizations, implying that executive salaries depend 
upon the organization’s size and suggesting that nondistribution constraint is not strictly 
enforced. 
 
Given the varying conclusions about the pay-performance relationship, Grasse et al. (2014) 
inferred that different types of nonprofits may be sensitive to different measures of 
performance. On the one hand, Baber, Daniel, and Roberts (2002) noted that, despite the fact 
that performance oftentimes is difficult to quantify, they found a positive correlation between 
program spending and managers’ compensation in a sample of charitable organizations in 
Maryland, assuming that managers are rewarded for increases in direct program spending. On 
the other hand, Newton (2015) found a significantly negative relationship between CEO-to-
employee relative pay and multiple measures of nonprofit performance (i.e., program spending 
ratio) in a sample of large charitable nonprofits. Overall, we see a sector that may be rewarding 
one measure of performance (i.e., funding directed toward programs) but may be ignoring other 
indicators. 
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Nonprofit Performance 
 
Measuring organizational performance can be more difficult with nonprofit research, as 
outcomes such as return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), or other financial measures 
are not readily available or applicable. One major concern with assessing financial performance 
is that different measures are used in research, making it difficult to compare financial 
performance outcomes across studies (see Ritchie & Kolodinsky, 2003, for review). An 
additional concern regarding nonprofit performance is that performance is often reported by 
board members and therefore does not represent an objective measure comparable to objective 
measures commonly found in strategic management research (Brown, 2005). This problem 
becomes even more pronounced when outcomes used by the board or CEO are unique to the 
organization because the relationship to financial performance is unclear (Zimmermann & 
Stevens, 2006). Even if objective performance measures were available and comparable across 
organizations, Kaplan (2001) argues that financial measures “are not sufficient to motivate and 
evaluate mission accomplishments” (p. 353). Thus, it makes sense that organizations that exist 
to serve the public good must also consider nonfinancial measures of organizational 
performance. 
 
In order to capture organizational performance beyond typical accounting measures, individuals 
and institutions track how efficiently charitable organizations use their funds (Charity 
Navigator, 2012; Kistruck, Qureshi, & Beamish, 2013). These efficiency measures are a 
comparison of the money used to serve constituents in relation to the administrative expenses 
used to run the organization. Nonetheless, these efficiency measures do not tell the entire story. 
Mitchell (2013) found that nonprofit managers considered goal attainment as even more 
important than financial effectiveness or efficiency. Miller (2002) suggests some relevant 
measures to assess nonprofit organization goal attainment include volunteer service (i.e., hours 
or number of unique volunteers), membership growth, or the amount of money donated rather 
than revenue. Given this past research and the practical knowledge that nonprofit organizations 
differ in important ways from for-profit entities, our study aims to build upon research in the 
nonprofit sector by including multiple measures of performance, namely, both financial 
efficiency as well as a nonfinancial measure of the number of individuals served during the year. 
We believe this dual approach to measuring organizational performance most effectively 
incorporates a nonprofit CEO’s emphasis on both improving organizational outcomes and 
benefiting individuals the organization serves. 
 
 
Theoretical Development 
 
Agency theory, which unravels relationships in which one party determines the work to be done 
while another party performs that work, has typically been used when examining the 
relationship between CEO compensation and organizational performance (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
However, agency theory does not explain well the intricies of the role of the board of directors in 
monitoring the CEO in the nonprofit setting (Cumberland, Kerrick, D’Mello, & Petrosko, 2015). 
One limitation of using agency theory to understand nonprofit leadership is that it does not 
adequately focus on the desire to help a broad array of stakeholders and to benefit the 
community (Pepper & Gore, 2015). A second limitation is that agency theory does not take into 
account reasons why nonprofit leaders may sacrifice their own well-being (Dempsey & Sanders, 
2010). Olson (2000) proposed that, although there is some support for agency theory in a 
nonprofit setting, other psychological factors play an important role in understanding these 
relationships. 
 
Journal of Public and Nonprofit Affairs 
 160 
We suggest that servant leadership theory and social comparison theory can help shed some 
light on these limitations, and thus we utilize these two theoretical frameworks to better 
understand nonprofit CEO compensation and explain why a nonprofit CEO may knowingly 
work for lower compensation than his/her peers. This contributes to the nonprofit and 
management literature by responding to the call for alternative theoretical paradigms that 
explore how people engage in both self-sacrificing and self-serving behaviors as well as how 
these behaviors have an impact on organizations (Krause, Semadeni, & Cannella, 2014). 
 
Serving Others Before Self 
 
Servant leaders focus on follower empowerment and growth primarily through meeting 
followers’ needs (Liden, Wayne, Zhao, & Henderson, 2008; van Dierendonck, 2010). Servant 
leaders are unique in that, instead of the typical top-down approach to leadership, which 
mirrors a pyramid structure (i.e., one leader at the top being served by multiple followers), 
servant leadership flips the pyramid upside down such that the leader “serves” organizational 
members (Greenleaf, 1977; van Dierendonck, 2010). Nonprofit and public service leadership 
requires motivation toward doing good for the community and willingness to mobilize and build 
social capital to achieve the social mission of the organization (King, 2004; Quarter & 
Richmond, 2001), which mirrors servant leader motivation to serve others. Such leaders are 
intrinsically motivated to carry out their work rather than motivated by extrinsic means, and 
have a strong overlap between the organization’s social mission and their personal values and 
goals (Perry, Hondeghem, & Wise, 2010; Wright, Moynihan, & Pandey, 2012). Given that 
nonprofit CEOs are motivated by intrinsic factors and by achieving a social mission, we suggest 
that it is more likely that these CEOs will be less concerned with their pay relative to their peers 
at other organizations. According to past research, these servant leaders will be concerned with 
promoting high procedural justice climates in their organizations (Ehrhart, 2004), which means 
that their compensation should be in line with what the organization can pay according to its 
unique attributes. In addition, servant leaders sacrifice extrinsic gain for the benefit of others 
(Conger & Kanungo, 1994; Liden, et al., 2008). 
 
Comparing Others With Self 
 
Social comparison theory states that individuals assess their own abilities and potential relative 
to others (Festinger, 1954). Comparison with others provides a necessary benchmark that allows 
people to make judgments about themselves on various attributes, and it also allows one to 
estimate his or her own likelihood of success or ability to accomplish something, such as 
learning a new skill or changing careers. The motivation for comparison, however, is not to 
significantly outperform others but ultimately to achieve relative uniformity with others by 
being only slightly better (Festinger, 1954). The theory has been extended to explain such 
phenomena as an increase in individual charitable contributions during a fundraising campaign 
when the level of donations of others was known (Shang & Croson, 2006), an increase in firm 
performance at low pay disparity levels (Ridge, Aime, & White, 2015), and the degree of 
sensitivity between pay and performance within firms (Gartenberg & Wulf, 2017). 
 
 
Hypotheses 
 
Previous examinations of the relationship between relative CEO compensation and 
organizational performance have found mixed results (Frumkin & Keating, 2010; Grasse, Davis, 
& Ihrke, 2014; Carroll, Hughes, & Luksetich, 2005). We believe this may be because these 
studies typically use a “market worth” variable comprised of multiple inputs such as 
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organizational performance. One potential concern with this methodological approach of 
creating a “market worth” variable is that a CEO will use a peer group of similar organizations 
rather than an arbitrary variable created by scholars. Empirical evidence supports this claim, 
finding that nonprofit CEO compensation is more strongly predicted by CEO compensation of 
similar-sized organizations than by organizational performance (Frumkin & Keating, 2010). A 
second potential concern is that researchers have largely focused on the negative aspects of 
compensation inequality (Devers, Cannella, Reilly, & Yoder, 2007; Pfeffer & Langton, 1993) 
without discussing possible positive aspects of this inequality. Specifically, while past research 
has shown that social information like external comparisons can influence leader self-interested 
behaviors in the for-profit world (Rus, van Knippenberg, & Wisse, 2010), we suggest that this 
might not occur in a nonprofit environment. In fact, we go one step farther to consider whether 
the opposite may be true for nonprofits, namely, that the use of social information can lead to 
unselfish behavior. This unselfish behavior “Communicates the relatively unambiguous message 
that the leader has a progroup orientation” (van Knippenberg & van Knippenberg, 2005, p. 26). 
Thus, we consider the possibility that a CEO is willing to accept unequal compensation relative 
to actual peers to positively influence organizational performance. 
 
Financial and Nonfinancial Performance  
 
Nonprofit performance is a multifaceted concept. The absence of sole focus on the bottom line 
uniquely positions nonprofits to achieve multiple and complex goals. Thus, their performance 
can best be captured by a variety of measurements. Although there is no consensus as to what 
those measures are, conventionally accepted dimensions of nonprofit performance are financial 
(e.g., revenue diversification, overhead cost, and cost savings) and nonfinancial measures (e.g., 
number of clients served, number of volunteers participated, and satisfaction levels), where 
financial and nonfinancial categories are complementary rather than mutually exclusive 
(Pandey, Kim, & Pandey, 2017). Boateng, Akamavi, and Ndoro (2016) indicated that a more 
accurate representation of nonprofit performance is achieved by using a combination of factors. 
In this vein, we are utilizing two measures of nonprofit performance—financial and 
nonfinancial—to capture the distinct multidmensionality of the nonprofit sector.  
 
According to previous work by Strachan and Myslewski (1997), looking specifically at 
professional associations, the strategy to determine executive compensation should include 
consideration of three components: the business environment (e.g., levels of competition and 
general directions of the market), culture and management philosophy (e.g., external pressures 
of efficiency and effectiveness), and compensation philosophy (e.g., comparative pay levels 
across associations). From this standpoint, which aligns with social comparison theory, an 
organization will try to perform comparatively better to improve organizational status in the 
competitive market. And, according to servant leadership theory, accepting a lower 
compensation can be a motivational strategy for a CEO to encourage higher performance in a 
culture that values its employees by minimizing the pay difference. 
 
Hypothesis1: Lower CEO compensation relative to peer CEOs will be related to higher 
nonfinancial organizational performance.  
 
Hypothesis2: Lower CEO compensation relative to peer CEOs will be related to higher 
financial organizational performance.  
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Organizational Size as a Moderator  
 
We propose that organizational size moderates the relationship between relative CEO 
compensation and organizational performance. Considering that organizational size greatly 
impacts the relationship between relative CEO compensation and organizational performance 
(Brown, 2005), we test four total hypotheses that investigate how organizational size can alter 
the relationships found in Hypotheses 1 and 2. We test these hypotheses utilizing two distinct 
measures that account for a nonprofit organization’s size (i.e., organization’s annual budget and 
number of full-time employees), and we discuss each of these in greater detail in the 
methodology section.  
 
We propose that the relationship between nonprofit CEO compensation and organizational 
performance will depend on organizational size. Smaller organizations must contend with the 
liabilities of smallness (Aldrich & Auster, 1986), which increases the difficulty of raising 
financial capital and acquiring critical human and social capital relative to their larger, more 
established counterparts. For smaller organizations, these resources are difficult to acquire 
because external stakeholders such as customers, suppliers, employees, and investors tend to 
prefer interacting with larger firms because their reliability and legitimacy are well established 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Stinchecombe, 1965; Stuart, 2000). As a result, CEOs of smaller 
firms must be highly involved with the organization’s day-to-day operations as resources are less 
available to hire additional staff with which to share decision-making responsibilities. CEO 
actions and decision-making in smaller organizations are therefore more closely associated with 
performance outcomes than in larger firms with a decentralized decision-making structure. In 
addition to CEOs being more involved with decision-making in small firms, they also may have 
fewer resources available to be dedicated to executive compensation that can be used to attract 
stakeholders. For example, Barnes, Harikumar, and Roth (2006) reported that, for smaller 
organizations, founder CEOs accept less compensation to avoid harming relationships with 
external stakeholders. As a result, we would expect smaller organizations to benefit more from 
lower CEO compensation because CEOs are more involved in day-to-day decision-making, and 
financial capital not used for compensation may be used to further support the organization’s 
mission (i.e., serving members), which ultimately improves financial efficiency. 
 
Hypothesis3: Annual budget moderates the relationship between relative CEO 
compensation and organizational performance, such that the negative relationship 
between CEO relative compensation and organizational nonfinancial performance will 
be stronger in organizations with a smaller annual budget. 
 
Hypothesis4: Annual budget moderates the relationship between relative CEO 
compensation and organizational performance, such that the negative relationship 
between CEO relative compensation and organizational financial performance will be 
stronger in organizations with a smaller annual budget. 
 
A second reason that organizational size might influence the relationship between relative CEO 
compensation and performance is that, in smaller organizations, CEOs will likely have a more 
direct influence on individual employees. In large corporate settings, most members of large 
organizations rarely come into contact with executives (Mowday & Sutton, 1993), which is likely 
the exact opposite experience of most employees working in small nonprofit organizations. 
Thus, the size of the organization has an important effect on employees’ daily experiences. For 
example, we expect that, in smaller organizations, employees have daily contact with the CEO 
and likely routine contact with the board of directors, which is not likely the case in large 
nonprofit organizations. For example, as president and CEO of YMCA of Greater Springfield, 
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James O’S. Morton managed staff and oversaw the YMCA’s internal operations and programs on 
a daily basis, often interacting closely with the YMCA staff and leadership team to accomplish 
these goals (Bridgespan, 2017). As a smaller nonprofit, being involved in the day-to-day 
operations as well as being responsible for setting the strategic direction all fell under his 
responsibility. We thus suggest that the number of employees can be used as a proxy to indicate 
firm size. Due to the tight-knit nature of small organizations, we suggest that employees may be 
more likely to be aware that their CEO is being paid less than other nonprofit CEOs of similarly 
sized organizations and argue that, given this knowledge, they will be inspired to work hard, 
improve financial efficiency, and ultimately serve more stakeholders, which leads to better 
organizational performance. Therefore, we propose: 
 
Hypothesis5: The number of employees moderates the relationship between relative 
CEO compensation and organizational performance, such that the negative 
relationship between CEO relative compensation and organizational nonfinancial 
performance will be stronger in organizations with fewer employees. 
 
Hypothesis6: The number of employees moderates the relationship between relative 
CEO compensation and organizational performance, such that the negative 
relationship between CEO relative compensation and organizational financial 
performance will be stronger in organizations with fewer employees. 
 
 
Methodology  
 
Sample 
 
The sample for this study is drawn from the American Society of Association Executives’ (ASAE) 
2010 Association Executive Compensation Benefits Survey. The ASAE represents over 7,400 
trade associations, individual membership societies, and voluntary organizations across the 
world (ASAE, 2017). Although trade associations can be incorporated under various tax-exempt 
designations, this paper narrows the focus to “public serving” 501(c)(3) organizations, which are 
also precluded from distributing any financial surpluses “to those who control the use of 
organizational assets” (Powell & Steinberg, 2006, p. 1). The 2010 survey included data on 1,262 
organizations of which 290 were 501(c)(3) organizations. In these organizations, CEOs are 
responsible for “governance, change management, staff performance, and the organization’s 
progress toward success” (ASAE, 2017). 
 
Because the focus of this study is to investigate organizational performance when CEOs know 
how their compensation compares with that of others, we only use data from organizations that 
used a compensation consultant or compensation benchmark to determine CEO salary. In other 
words, we only draw from a sample of organizations in which the CEO would have an accurate 
understanding of their salary relative to other CEOs. Although some research shows that 
corporate CEO compensation is higher in firms when compensation data or consultants are used 
(Murphy & Sandino, 2010), nonprofit CEOs may use their influence to be paid less than their 
market value. This objective measure comparing relative salary is preferred over self-reported 
comparisons because it is more resistant to social desirable responding (Tomassetti, Dalal, & 
Kaplan, 2016). After removing cases with missing data, our final sample is 154 organizations.  
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Dependent Variables 
 
Efficiency and the number of members served by the organization are the two outcomes of 
interest in our study. Consistent with Kistruck et al. (2013), efficiency is measured as 
organization expenditures specific to their charitable programs divided by total organization 
expenditures. Three survey questions were used to construct this variable, of which two were 
combined to capture organization nonprogram expenditures and one question to gauge total 
organization expenditures (see Table A1 in Appendix). Efficiency reflects an organizations’ 
ability to limit administrative and fund-raising expenses while maximizing the amount spent 
directly on programing (Kistruck et al., 2013).  
 
Our second dependent variable, individuals served, reflects the number of individuals served by 
the organization and thus represents the total number of individuals that benefit from the 
organization’s mission. We measured this using the survey question, “Approximately how many 
members or individuals are served by your organization (include all membership classes and 
leave blank, if not applicable)?” As the number of individuals served by the organization is not 
normally distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests p < .01), we used the natural 
logarithm of individuals served to normalize the distribution. 
 
Independent Variable 
 
The independent variable CEO base pay ratio is defined as the ratio of CEO base pay to the 
average base pay of other ASAE charitable organization CEOs. This compensation measure does 
not include bonuses or other forms of compensation because 54% of the CEOs had no additional 
compensation and of those that did report additional compensation, the additional amount was 
minimal (median $7,600; mean $15,710) in comparison with the average base salary, which 
ranged from $28,500 to $271,382 with a median and mean over $160,000. This measure is 
similar to the within-sample measure used by Ezzamel and Watson (1998). Rather than 
empirically estimating a pay anomaly, however, we used a comparison between base 
compensation and average sample compensation. We operationalized this variable differently 
than Ezzamel and Watson (1998) because financial performance and board characteristics are 
unavailable. Further, while CEO referents of small organizations often occupy multiple roles as 
part of the top management team such as CEO and CFO (Siegel & Hambrick, 2005) or a 
member of the board of directors (O’Reilly III, Main, & Crystal, 1988), these social comparisons 
may be inappropriate for some organizations (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997) such as 501(c)(3) 
organizations. 
 
Control Variables 
 
To control for organizational and CEO-level factors that may influence performance, we include 
control variables for organization budget, size, noncompete agreements, geographic scope, 
primary operating sector, CEO tenure, and CEO gender. To control for financial resources 
available to the organization, we included the natural logarithm of annual budget, a value that 
was reported by organizations to the question “What is the total annual budget for your 
organization (excluding for-profit subsidiary or foundation, if any)?” The natural logarithm of 
organization employees was used to control for firm size effects. It was measured using the 
question, “How many full-time staff or full-time equivalents (FTE) are employed in your 
organization (excluding for-profit subsidiary or foundation, if any)?” 
 
Noncompete, captured by the question, “Is there a noncompete clause in a written contract or a 
non-compete understanding in a more informal arrangement to prevent conflicts of interest 
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with other organizations?” was also a binary variable where CEOs with formal or informal 
noncompete agreements were coded as “1” (34%) and CEOs without such agreements were 
coded as “0” (66%). Noncompete agreements are used to limit employee mobility with the 
purpose of limiting knowledge transfer to competitors (Marx, Strumsky, & Fleming, 2009). 
Geographic scope is again a binary variable coded as “1” when the organization operates both 
within the United States and in at least one other country and was coded as “0” when the 
organization operates only in the United States. The majority of organizations (63%) in our 
sample operate internationally. Geographic scope is included in our analyses because it has been 
shown to influence CEO compensation (Carpenter, 1998). 
 
We also control for organizations’ primary subject area. The ASAE survey our data are drawn 
from includes 30 possible subject areas. Many of these subject areas, however, are closely 
related (e.g., law/government and law enforcement), so we combined categories into the 
following subsets, which we include in our analyses: wholesale (business, wholesale), 
manufacturing (automotive, equipment, raw materials), construction, services (administration, 
education, financial, healthcare, hospitality, international, labor, law, law enforcement, real 
estate, social welfare), agriculture, technology (architecture/engineering, energy, environment, 
scientific, telecommunications), and other (culture, fraternal/religious, sports). We included 
these subject areas because researchers have demonstrated that industry may be associated with 
compensation levels and structure (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990), and we take these subject areas 
to be rough proxies for industries. 
 
CEO tenure was measured as the number of years the CEO had held that position in the 
organization and ranged from under one year to 31 years. We include this as prior research, 
which has demonstrated that longer tenure may allow CEOs to build their influence within the 
organization and use that influence to gain a more preferable compensation package (van Essen 
et al., 2015). Last, we included CEO gender because research has demonstrated that female 
CEOs may be undercompensated relative to men (Mohan & Ruggiero, 2007). CEO gender was 
coded as “1” if the CEO was male (58%) and “0” if the CEO was female (42%). For the 
noncompete variable, if the data were missing, we coded this as “0” because we assumed that 
these items signal some level of CEO quality and that organizations would want to report factors 
associated with CEO quality. If data were missing for any other variable, the case was not 
included in our analyses. 
 
 
Results 
 
Ordinary least-squares regression was used to analyze the data. Moderation was tested by 
creating interaction terms (Baron & Kenny, 1986), and we centered interaction terms following 
suggested best practices (Aguinis & Gottfredson, 2010) to minimize multicollinearity concerns 
and aid in the interpretation of the results (Aiken & West, 1991). We tested for the presence of 
multicollinearity in our analyses by examining variance inflation factors (VIF); however, no 
evidence of multicollinearity was found. Table 1 presents means, standard deviations, and 
correlations for our data. The average organization in our sample served 14,974 members, had 
35 full-time employees, an annual budget of $1.5 million, and had a financial efficiency score of 
0.61 (meaning the average organization spent 61% of their annual budget on programing, and 
the remaining 39% on administrative costs). 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean S.D. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
1. Individuals Served (LN) 8.06 2.13                            
2. Efficiency 0.61 0.15 .30 **                          
3. Annual Budget (LN) 15.12 1.41 .56 ** .25 **                        
4. Firm Size (LN # 
employees) 
2.70 1.28 .57 ** -.05  .86 **                      
5. Noncompete 0.34 0.47 .02  -.12  .13  .18 *                    
6. Geographic Scope 4.83 1.97 .49 ** .27 ** .54 ** .43 ** .05                   
7. Wholesale 0.44 0.50 .32 ** .28 ** .21 ** .14  -.02  .35 **                
8. Manufacturing 0.18 0.38 -.48 ** -.25 ** -.16  -.12  -.08  -.34 ** -.41 **              
9. Construction 0.01 0.11 -.03  .10  .03  -.01  .04  -.05  -.10  -.05             
10. Services 0.10 0.30 .08  .05  .03  .02  .04  .04  -.29 ** -.15  -.04           
11. Agriculture 0.12 0.32 -.17 * -.15  -.22 ** -.15  .00  -.10  -.32 ** -.17 * -.04  -.12         
12. Technology 0.07 0.26 .00  -.15  -.02  .01  .07  -.08  -.24 ** -.13  -.03  -.09  -.10       
13. CEO Tenure 8.63 6.75 .01  -.06  -.03  -.05  -.06  -.10  -.16 * .02  -.09  .12  .00  .22 **    
14. CEO Gender 1.48 0.50 -.24 ** -.10  -.26 ** -.23 ** .00  -.13  -.08  -.10  .00  .12  .01  .09  .05   
15. CEO Base Pay Ratio 1.13 0.59 .29 ** -.01  .76 ** .78 ** .14  .40 ** .09  .05  .09  .04  -.19 * -.03  .01  -.16 
Note. N=154. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
Serving Others at the Expense of Self 
 
 167 
Table 2. Regression Results for Individuals Served 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Annual Budget 0.02 0.12 0.54** 
Firm Size (# of employees) 0.39** 0.54** 0.24† 
Noncompete -0.08 -0.08 -0.09† 
Geographic Scope 0.13† 0.15* 0.12† 
Wholesale -0.15 -0.10 -0.07 
Manufacturing -0.55** -0.46** -0.43** 
Construction -0.07 -0.04 -0.04 
Services -0.09 -0.05 -0.06 
Agriculture -0.26** -0.23** -0.21** 
Technology -0.13† -0.11 -0.10 
CEO Tenure 0.06 0.08 0.06 
CEO Gender -0.18** -0.16** -0.14* 
CEO Base Pay Ratio  -0.30** -0.34** 
CEO Base Pay Ratio x Annual Budget   0.72** 
CEO Base Pay Ratio x Firm Size   -0.72** 
F 16.99** 17.46** 16.67** 
R2 0.59 0.62 0.64 
Adj- R2 0.56 0.58 0.61 
N 154 154 154 
Note. Standardized regression coefficients.  All results are two-tailed.  †p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01  
 
 
All six models were statistically significant and accounted for 36% to 60% of unexplained variance. 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 proposed that CEOs with less compensation than their peers will have a 
positive relationship with organizational performance. Results for the dependent variable 
individuals served are presented in Table 2, while results for the dependent variable efficiency 
are shown in Table 3. In Model 1 (Tables 2 and 3), we enter our control variables. In Model 2 
(Tables 2 and 3), we introduce our independent variable CEO base pay ratio. In Table 2, the 
coefficient relating CEO base pay ratio to individuals served is negative and statistically 
significant. This means that the number of individuals served is higher when CEO relative pay is 
lower, supporting Hypothesis 1. Table 3 shows that the coefficient for CEO base pay ratio is 
negative but not statistically significant for financial efficiency, thus rejecting Hypothesis 2. 
 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 proposed that the organization’s annual budget would moderate the 
relationship between CEO relative pay and organizational performance such that the 
relationship would be stronger for organizations with a smaller annual budget. In Model 3 
(Table 2), the relationship between this interaction (CEO base pay ratio and annual budget) and 
individuals served is positive and statistically significant. This interaction is more clearly seen in 
Figure 1, which shows that, in an organization with a smaller annual budget, having a CEO with 
lower relative pay is related to higher organizational performance, as measured by the number 
of individuals served. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is supported. Results for the relationship between this  
interaction (CEO base pay ratio and annual budget) and financial efficiency are shown in Model 
3 (Table 3). This regression coefficient is positive and statistically significant. Figure 2 shows 
this interaction. CEOs with higher relative pay have lower financial efficiency when their 
organization has a smaller annual budget, supporting Hypothesis 4.  
 
 
 
 
Journal of Public and Nonprofit Affairs 
 168 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Interaction Between CEO Relative Pay and Annual Budget on Individuals Served 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Interaction Between CEO Relative Pay and Annual Budget on Financial Efficiency 
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Table 3. Regression Results for Financial Efficiency 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Annual Budget 0.91** 0.96** 1.69** 
Firm Size (# of employees) -0.91** -0.84** -1.35** 
Noncompete -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 
Geographic Scope 0.05 0.06 0.06 
Wholesale 0.00 0.02 0.03 
Manufacturing -0.25* -0.21† -0.16 
Construction 0.05 0.06 0.06 
Services -0.01 0.00 -0.02 
Agriculture -0.14 -0.13 -0.12 
Technology -0.14 -0.13 -0.10 
CEO Tenure -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 
CEO Gender -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 
CEO Base Pay Ratio  -0.13 -0.35** 
CEO Base Pay Ratio x Annual Budget   1.26** 
CEO Base Pay Ratio x Firm Size   -1.05** 
F 8.25** 7.71** 9.20** 
R2 0.41 0.42 0.50 
Adj- R2 0.36 0.36 0.45 
N 154 154 154 
 
Note. Standardized regression coefficients.  All results are two-tailed.  †p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01  
 
 
In Hypotheses 5 and 6, firm size (as measured by the number of full-time employees) is 
proposed to moderate the relationship between CEO relative pay and organizational 
performance such that the relationship will be stronger for smaller organizations. The 
interaction term in Model 3 (Table 2) is negative and statistically significant. Figure 3 shows that 
this interaction between CEO pay ratio and organizational size is rather complex. When the 
organization is larger (more employees), CEOs with a higher pay ratio lead firms that serve 
fewer individuals. However, when the organization is smaller, CEOs with a higher pay ratio have 
higher performance, as measured by the numbers of individuals served. Thus, Hypothesis 5 is 
not supported. In Model 3 (Table 3), the regression coefficient for this interaction (CEO pay 
ratio and firm size) predicting financial efficiency is negative and statistically significant. The 
interaction plot in Figure 4 shows that financial efficiency is lower when CEO pay is higher in 
larger firms. However, financial efficiency is higher when CEO pay is higher in smaller firms. 
Thus, Hypothesis 6 is not supported.  
 
In addition to our hypothesized relationships, a few interesting relationships were observed with 
the control variables. First, in the models with the dependent variable individuals served, 
manufacturing and agricultural industries demonstrated significantly negative relationships in 
all three models, possibly suggesting that trade and professional associations in both industries 
tend to have smaller memberships. However, this association becomes insignificant when 
interacting variables of organization’s size and base pay are introduced in Model 3. Geographic 
scope has a positive but weaker effect, implying that membership grows with geographic 
expansion. Even more interesting is the effect of the CEO gender on individuals served. The 
results suggest that female CEOs positively affect membership numbers. Regression results on 
efficiency do not support the same conclusions. Manufacturing has the same negative (but much 
weaker) effect on efficiency of organizations, and other control variables do not reach statistical 
significance to warrant similar conclusions.  
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Figure 3. Interaction Between CEO Relative Pay and Firm Size on Individuals Served 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Interaction Between CEO Relative Pay and Firm Size on Efficiency 
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Discussion 
 
Using a sample of 501(c)(3) trade and membership associations, this research examined the 
relationship between executive compensation and organizational performance from the 
perspective of CEO social comparisons rather than the more typical agency theory. Although 
trade associations and scientific societies do not constitute the core of charitable nonprofits one 
typically thinks of when talking about the nonprofit sector, these organizations provide 
important public benefit directly or indirectly through educating the public about advances in 
their respective fields, often setting ethical and safety standards.  
 
Our purpose was to examine how nonprofit CEOs who know they earn less than their peers may 
influence organizational performance. Our empirical results confirm that CEO relative pay 
influences two measures of organizational performance, i.e., the number of individuals served 
by the organization (nonfinancial performance) and organization efficiency (financial 
performance). While it makes intuitive sense that an organization’s financial performance would 
improve if a CEO were paid less, our finding that CEOs who earn less than their peers might lead 
organizations to higher levels of nonfinancial performance was more intriguing. It seems that 
servant leadership does explain these results better than agency theory would, even in not 
“purely” charitable nonprofits. This finding is important because trade associations and 
professional societies are commonly considered to embody the values of the for-profit industries 
they serve. However, as our study showed, professional associations also embrace the more 
traditional values of the nonprofit sector, such as stewardship and accountability, so that the 
opposite of conventional wisdom can be true. Our results show that the pay-performance 
relationship in trade associations resembles socially oriented nonprofits, like art organizations 
and libraries, more so than revenue-driven hospitals and insurance organizations. On the other 
hand, our findings can also be interpreted using social comparison theory, where lower 
compensation levels can be used as a strategy to compete with others for a more favored and 
positive organizational image in the market.  
 
We also demonstrated that contextual factors of firm size (measured as both annual budget and 
number of full-time employees) can influence this relationship. Our results were in line with 
past research suggesting that different subsectors of the nonprofit sector yield different patterns 
of behavior. However, even more nuanced differences can be observed when looking at 
organizational size. Trade and professional associations with larger annual budgets and smaller 
staff size react to a change in relative CEO pay by increasing their organizational performance 
and financial efficiency if CEO pay ratio is lower. As a result, these nonprofit associations seem 
to react in a more selfless manner than associations with smaller annual budget and larger staff. 
Conversely, associations that are smaller in annual budgets but larger in staff size serve fewer 
stakeholders and are less efficient when relative CEO’s pay is comparatively higher. 
Organizations with a bigger staff size routinely will have larger overhead, so the negative 
association with financial efficiency is not surprising. However, the fact that organizations with 
larger staff also serve comparatively fewer individuals is counterintuitive and warrants further 
investigation. One possible explanation could be that CEOs of such organizations are inefficient 
with their resources, which manifests itself in their smaller membership size.  
 
Another interesting finding that deserves further attention is that CEO gender was related to an 
increase in the number of individuals served but not to our measure of financial efficiency. 
Female CEOs on average serve in smaller nonprofits, and their salaries lag behind their male 
counterparts even in the nonprofit sector (LeRoux & Langer, 2016), which could possibly skew 
the relationship with the financial performance measures. Further, the results of the 
relationship between CEO gender and financial performance are generally mixed, supporting 
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our inconsistent conclusion (Pillemer, Graham, & Burke, 2014; Peni, 2014). Additional analysis 
is needed to explain this relationship. However, it can be suggested that female leaders focus 
their attention on expanding associations’ reach, which requires an expansion in overhead 
resources, such as fundraising, employee salaries, and benefits, and these expenditures do not 
directly translate into financial efficiency gains.  
 
Our findings also have practical relevance for nonprofit stakeholders, boards of directors, and 
CEOs. Large nonprofit CEO salary increases in recent decades have piqued public interest 
(Frydman & Saks, 2010), so much so that the state of New York has placed a salary cap on 
nonprofits that receive state funding. In light of this, understanding when higher or lower 
relative CEO compensation can benefit nonprofit performance is important. Specifically, 
nonprofit CEOs who sacrifice monetary rewards by having a base salary lower than their average 
peer CEO tend to lead organizations with superior performance, especially if the organization 
has a smaller annual budget (the mean annual budget in our sample was $1. 5 million).  
 
Considering our findings, we do not suggest that a reduction in CEO compensation of 
professional associations will result in a direct and immediate increase in organizational 
financial efficiency and the number of individuals served. As our findings show, these 
connections are contextual and will also depend on a number of other factors. Further, the 
common concerns that large nonprofits are becoming more business-like, especially in the area 
of employee incentives and compensation, do not apply to the subset of professional 
associations in this study. One potential implication of this finding could be that the managerial 
compensation issues could be more effectively dealt with if focused on intrinsic, rather than 
exclusively extrinsic, incentives.  
 
Limitations and Future Research  
 
This study has several limitations, which we hope can provide avenues for future research. First, 
we used cross-sectional data as opposed to time-series data and utilized regression analysis, 
meaning that we cannot make claims of causality, and the pattern of results could in fact be in 
the reverse direction. Unfortunately, time-series data were not available for this study. Second, 
although we consider our focus on nonprofit rather than for-profit organizations, which is a 
strength of the paper, we used data from a compensation survey of a specific set of nonprofits, so 
results may not be generalizable to other types of nonprofit organizations. Relatedly, our 
analysis did not account for volunteers within each nonprofit, as this data were not available. 
While we believe that membership organizations may be different from more traditional 
nonprofits in that they may rely less heavily on volunteers, we assume that variance in 
volunteers or volunteer hours would alter our outcome variable measuring the number of 
individuals served. However, recent research finds that, even with for-profit organizations, the 
type of CEO compensation promotes more socially responsible decisions (Kang, Chiang, 
Huangthanapan, & Downing, 2015), and CEO identity as a philanthropist also has an impact on 
corporate philanthropy (Dennis & Buchholtz, 2009). Thus, future research should continue to 
examine multiple measures of organization performance, such as the number of individuals 
served or money spent providing a public service. Recent research of nonprofit hospitals finds 
that higher CEO compensation is related to more subjective performance measures such as 
patient satisfaction but not more objective performance measures of patient health like 
mortality rates and readmission rates (Joynt, Le, Orav, & Jha, 2014). Understanding how CEO 
pay has an impact on nonprofits is especially of interest given recent nonprofit financial 
scandals, including theft, fraud, and embezzlement (Stevens & Flaherty, 2013). Further 
examination of the traits, values, and context of organizational power (Williams, 2014) that can 
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lead to a leader making decisions for the benefit of others rather than the self will also be useful 
when organizations look to hire a CEO.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 Survey Items 
Variable Survey item & response choices Response type/choices 
Annual budget / 
total expenditures 
What is the total annual budget for your 
organization (excluding for-profit 
subsidiary or foundation, if any)? 
Open-ended response 
Organization   
non-program 
expenditures 
Organization expense for the total of base 
salaries/bonuses/commissions/employer-
provided deferred compensation 
(excluding expense for employee benefits 
and excluding for-profit subsidiary or 
foundation, if any)? 
Open-ended response 
 Total organization expense for employee 
benefits excluding for-profit subsidiary or 
foundation, if any? 
Open-ended response 
Individuals   
served 
Approximately how many members or 
individuals are served by your organization 
(include all membership 
classes and leave blank, if not applicable)? 
Open-ended response 
Firm size (# of 
employees) 
How many full-time staff or full-time 
equivalents (FTE) are employed in your 
organization (excluding for-profit 
subsidiary or foundation, if any)? 
Open-ended response 
Noncompete Is there a non-compete clause in a written 
contract or a non-compete understanding 
in a more informal arrangement to prevent 
conflicts of interest with other 
organizations? 
CEO: 
  Yes 
  No 
 
Geographic    
scope 
Which of the following best describes the 
scope of the membership or constituency 
your organization serves? 
(Check only one) 
  Local 
  State/Province 
  Regional (multi-state or 
province) 
  US only 
  US and Canada combined 
  US with some international 
  International 
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Industry What is the primary interest/subject area 
of your organization? 
(Check only one) 
  Administration 
  Administration  
  Agriculture 
  Architecture/engineering 
  Automotive 
  Business 
  Construction 
  Culture 
  Education 
  Energy 
  Environment 
  Financial 
  Fraternal/religious 
  Healthcare (physician) 
  Healthcare (nursing) 
  Healthcare (allied health) 
  Healthcare (other) 
  Hospitality 
  International 
  Labor 
  Law 
  Law enforcement 
  Manufacturing (equipment) 
  Manufacturing (raw 
materials) 
  Real estate 
  Scientific 
  Social welfare 
  Sports 
  Telecommunications 
  Wholesale 
  Other (specify) 
CEO tenure Years in current position Open-ended response 
CEO gender Gender CEO: 
  Male 
  Female 
CEO base pay Base salary Open-ended response 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
